We demonstrate that in a CAPM economy Walras Law and the Tobin Separation Property characterize market demand on nite sets of prices. Consequently, for any number n there exist CAPM economies which have at least n equilibria and hence have n di erent beta pricing formulas. It is shown that the lower bound on the number of equilibria, n, is robust to pertubations of endowments.
Introduction
The Capital Asset Pricing Model ( CAPM ) is a rich source of intuition and the basis for many practical nancial decisions. Being built around the means and covariances of the payo s of securities, it nds its roots in Markowitz's (1952) description of the mean-variance portfolio selection problem. In its equilibrium form, the CAPM goes back to Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) . Given an assumption of \variance-aversion" on agents' preferences it can be shown that, for every announced price system, all agents will be satis ed with holding shares of the same two funds, the riskless asset and the price system (Tobin (1958) ). At equilibrium the later fund can be replaced by the market portfolio. From this Mutual Fund property one then deduces a simple and extremely useful linear pricing relation expressed in terms of betas and rates of returns.
Recently new e orts have been devoted to the study of the CAPM as a general-equilibrium model in which the natural questions of existence (c.f. Nielsen (1990) and Allingham (1991) ) and uniqueness (c.f. Nielsen (1988) and Dana (1994) ) of an equilibrium are important. In this note we continue along this line of research and address the question of the structure of market demand in the CAPM. We will show that given any choice of a nite number of price systems and according demands satisfying Walras Law and the Tobin Separation Property there exist two variance-averse agents whose market demand coincides with the preassigned values. This result parallels results known in the general equilibrium literature (c.f. Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982) for a survey and Andreu (1982) for such a result on a nite number of prices).
Our result thus shows that the Tobin Separation Property is the additional structure which is gained in the CAPM over the classical general equilibrium model (c.f. Arrow and Debreu (1954) ). As a corollary it is obtained that for any number n there exists a CAPM economy which has at least n equilibria. Across these equilibria relative prices of assets and asset allocations di er. Hence there are at least n di erent beta-pricing formulas. The lower bound on the number of equilibria, n, is shown to be robust to endowment pertubations.
The Model
Let (M; M; ) be a probability space. Consider L, the space of real{valued measurable functions on (M; M; ). We endow L with the scalar product x y = E(x; y) where E(x; y) = R M x(m)y(m)d and with the norm kxk = q E(x; x).
For later reference we write the covariance of x; y 2 L by Cov(x; y) = E(x; y) ? E(x)E(y), where E(x) = R M x(m)d is the expected value of x. The consumption set will be the subset of L with nite variance, L 2 ( ) = fx 2 L j kxk 2 < 1g.
The price space is the consumption space's dual space, also L 2 ( ).
Let X denote the marketed subspace of the consumption space L 2 ( ). We assume that X is a closed vector space. The space X can be interpreted as the set of linear combinations of an underlying set of securities in L 2 ( ). Security markets are complete if X = L 2 ( ); otherwise they are incomplete. Let 1I be a riskless asset, in the sense that 1I(m) = 1 for all m in M. We assume that 1I 2 X. It is convenient to decompose every x 2 L 2 ( ) as the sum of a riskless asset with the same mean as x and a vector that has mean 0, x x1I +x, where x = E(x) and E(x) =x 1I = 0.
We normalize prices so that p = 1I +p, i.e. p = 1 for all p 2 L 2 ( ) we consider. An agent i = 1; : : : ; I is described by his endowments w i 2 X and his utility function u i : X ! IR. The agent's decision problem is max x2X;p x p w i u i (x) Under the assumptions made, this decision problem can be derived from an agent's portfolio choice problem by recognizing that asset prices must be arbitrage free; i.e. they can be expressed in terms of state prices p 2 L 2 ( ).
Furthermore, note that without loss of generality we can restrict state prices to ly in X. Components of p which are in X ? do not contribute to the value of comsumption bundles in X.
Given this set-up, the essential assumption that makes the model a CAPM is the Assumption 1 (mean{variance preferences) Every agent i = 1; : : : ; I has variance averse mean{variance preferences, i.e. there exist functions v i : IR IR + ! IR; ( ; ) 7 ! v i ( ; ) increasing in and decreasing in such that for all x 2 X u i (x) = v i ( (x); (x)) , where (x) = E(x) and (x) = kxk.
In addition, for demand to be a well de ned function, we introduce the following assumption which goes back to Sharpe (1964) .
Assumption 2 (strict quasi{concavity)
For every agent i = 1; : : : ; I the utility function v i is continuous and strictly quasi{concave.
De nition. A consumer that satis es Assumptions 1 and 2 is called a CAPM consumer.
The Main Result
The following proposition on demand of a CAPM consumer is due to Tobin (1958) .
Proposition 1 (Tobin Separation Property) For all p 2 X the demand of a CAPM consumer i lies in the span of 1I and p.
More precisely it has the form x i (p) = p w i + kpk i (p) 1I ? i (p)p kpk (1) where i (p) is a real valued non-negative function and i (0) = 0.
Proof. Let us rst note that ifp = 0, then the price is collinear to the riskless asset. In this case the riskless asset is the most preferred consumption plan in the budget set since any other plan would have the same mean and a greater variance. This means that (0) = 0 and the formula still makes sense wheñ p = 0. Let x 2 arg max x2X u(x) s: t: p x p w. Then by Assumption 1, p x = p w.
We rst show that x is in the span of 1I and p; or { equivalently { 1I andp: Decompose x = y + z, where z is perpendicular to 1I andp: Write y in the form y = 1I ? p kpk , for some scalars and . From this follows that p z = 0 so that y is also budget feasible. But from z being perpendicular to 1I it follows that x = y. Furthermore kxk 2 = kỹ +zk 2 = kỹk 2 + kzk 2 > kỹk becausez is perpendicular toỹ. Hence z = 0.
We next deduce = p w + kpk from Walras' Law, p y = p w. To show that is non negative, note that E(x) = p w + kpk and V ar(x) = 2 . Thus, since Variance is disliked, (p w + kpkj (p)j)1I ? j (p)j~p kpk , is preferred to (p w + kpk(?j (p)j))1I ? (?j (p)j)~p kpk unless = 0, where j j denotes the absolute value of . This implies that is non-negative.
Strict quasi{concavity implies the uniqueness of the optimal portfolio. This ends the proof of Proposition 1.
4
The Tobin Separation Property is inherited by market demand x(p) = P I i=1 x i (p). Taking the market clearing condition x(p) = w into account (where w = P I i=1 w i ) establishes the Mutual Fund Property. This property says that at equilibrium every agent holds a certain fraction of just two funds: the market portfolio w and the riskless asset 1I.
The main result shows that the Tobin Separation Property is the chief additional structure which a CAPM demand has compared with the classical ArrowDebreu model does not possess. These half{lines may or may not intersect. The rst agent will be given the endowment w 1 = 0. Then the half-lines B 1 (p k ) never intersect.
Take w 2 = w as the second agent's endowment. For everyp k de ne k as the minimal rst coordinate of the intersection of B 2 (p k ) with B 2 (p l ); l 6 = k. Let furthermore 2 (p k ) = min( k =2; (p k )=2). In the two dimensional space, the weak axiom of revealed preference is not violated for agent 2 if he is required to demand the point in B 2 (p k ) with coordinate 2 (p k ). Figure 2 illustrates this decomposition. In this gure the symbol denotes the market demand that is decomposed into the rst and the second agent's demand, denoted by and , respectively. We introduce now an auxiliary economy in which we shall only specify preferences of the agents on two goods (not endowments). The rst good, the quantity of which is denoted by y 1 corresponds to x in L, the second good, the quantity of which is denoted by y 2 is a linear decreasing function of kxk of the form y 2 (x) = K ? kxk. To every utility function V i in this auxiliary economy one associates one in the original economy by composition (u i (x) = v i (y 1 (x); y 2 (x)), y 1 (x) = x, y 2 (x) = K ? kxk 0:) This will put us in the position to apply an extension of Afriat's theorem given by Chiappori and Rochet (1987) . Figure 3 By construction, the demand of both agents satis es the weak axiom of revealed preference which in two dimension is equivalent to the strong axiom (cf. Rose (1958) ). Furthermore, we have chosen the demand of individuals so that it is di erent for all price vectors p 1 ; : : : ; p n , so that the strong version of the strong axiom of revealed preference (cf. Chiappori and Rochet (1987) ) is satis ed.
Hence, for each agent there is a continuously di erentiable, strictly concave, monotonic utility function, v i , rationalizing his demand behavior.
The continuously di erentiable and strictly convex mean{variance utility function is given by the function v i restricted to IR + 1I + IR +p . Hence, a continuous and convex utility function v i ( ; ) exists so that for every i = 1; 2 and l, p l w i + kp l k i (p l )) ; i (p l )) = arg max Summing the demand of the two agents ends the proof of the theorem.
2
Theorem 1 parallels the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results which show that on a compact set of prices any continuous function which satis es Walras Law can be generated as the market excess demand of an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with as many agents as the dimension of the commodity space. In our result we only need two consumers to generate an in nite dimensional market demand. This is possible because due to the mean-variance assumption the commodity space we work with becomes e ectively two dimensional. A more substantial di erence is that we do not impose any non-negativity constraints on individual demands. Introducing such constraints in the CAPM would rule out the important case of normal distributions and moreover would con ict with the Tobin-sepatation properly. With non-negativity constraints market demand has some additional properties (cf. Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982) ) and in this case market excess demand has some additional properties when -as it is in our theorem -aggregate endowments are given at the outset (cf. Koch (1989) ). The most important di erence is that our theorem holds on a nite set of prices only. This assumption is however essential since not every function (p) can be decomposed as a ( nite) sum of functions of p w i and kpk. Note that sums of the form P n i=1 i (p w i ; kpk) cannot generate arbitrary cross derivatives of all order. For our result it is not essential that in the nite set of prices we consider, no pair of prices has the same norm. In our construction we need this asssumption because it might otherwise happen that prices with the same norm give the same value to the market portfolio and yet market demand is di erent for these two prices. Following our construction, however individual demand has to be the same for both prices since in the (1I;p) space very agent's budget lines are identical in the two situations. We can dispense with this assumption at the expense of assuming that (p) is bounded away from zero. If this is the case, we choose a vectorŵ 2 X such that for any such prices the value ofŵ di ers. We then endow agent one with w 2 1I+"ŵ. Concerning agent 2, now being endowed with w ? ( w 2 1I + "ŵ), we follow the same construction as before. Note however that the budget lines of agent 1 might intersect now. Letting " tend to zero we can ensure that these intersections tend to the 1I axis. Consequently, there is some " > 0 for which the residual market demand which agent 1 has to consume is larger than the largest value of these intersections. The proof is then completed as previously.
Number of CAPM-equilibria
In this section we show that for any number n there exist CAPM economies with at least n equilibria. The equilibria will di er in relative asset prices as well as in asset allocations. Hence there are at least n di erent beta-pricing relations. Furthermore, the lower bound on the number of equilibria, n, is robust 
Hence equilibrium prices must be such thatp is colinear tow, sayp = w for some 0. Theorem 1 has shown that on nite domains the function (p) := P i i (p) does only need to satisfy the non-negativity condition (p) 0. Thus leaving the decomposition of (p) to Theorem 1, a CAPM-equilibrium is completely described by a pair of non-negative scalars ( ; ). Consequently it is obtained Corollary 1
For any number n there exist CAPM-economies with at least n equilibria. Furthermore, the lower bound on the number of equilibria, n, is robust to pertubations of the endowments.
Proof. Consider the pairs ( k ; kwk) k=1;:::;n where k > 0 ; k = 1; : : : ; n are n di erent scalars. Then p k = 1I + kw ; k = 1; : : : ; n are n di erent equilibrium price vectors. Indeed, p k w = (1I + kw )( w1I ?w) = w ? k kwk 2 and kp k k = k kwk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To make the lower bound on the number of equilibria robust, for intermediate values of choose to be alternating between some positive and some negative value. Application of Theorem 1 to all these values (including the original values 1 ; : : :; n ) gives a CAPM-economy with at least n equilibria. The market demand function : IR + ! IR + is given by the sum of the two agent's demand 1 ; 2 which by the Corollary in Chiappori and Rochet (1987) are continuous functions of income and (relative) prices, i.e.
( ) = 1 (0; kwk) + 2 ( w ? kwk 2 ; kwk) :
Market excess demand is a function Z( ; w) = ( ; w) ? kwk. Now suppose we did perturb w slightly toŵ. As Z is continuous in w, for the intermediate values of which we have chosen Z( ;ŵ) remains strictly positive respectively strictly negative. And as Z is continuous in by the mean value theorem we still obtain at least n equilibria.
2
The equilibria which are constructed in Corollary 1 di er with respect to the size of the risk premium which is deducted from the expected value of an assets payo . In the CAPM risk is measured by the covariance of an asset and the market portfolio. Recall that w = w1I ?w and p k = 1I + kw .
Thus the value of an asset x 2 X is given by p k x = (1I + kw ) x = x + kw x
Note thatw x = cov(w; x) = ?cov(w; x) thus p k x = x ? k cov(w; x)
Hence in every CAPM-equilibrium risk is measured in the same way. The risk premium however is indeterminate.
